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Abstract: Because there is no agreed use of the term ‘self’, or characteristic features or even
paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of ‘the self’ to figure in philosophical problems. The
term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the
heading of ‘self’ are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking
of selves.
I
People often speak as if there were a serious philosophical problem about selves. Is
there a self? Is the self knowable? How does the self relate to the body? These and
other questions are thought to make up something called the problem of the self.
I doubt seriously that there is any such problem. Not because the self is unproblem-
atic, or because there are unproblematically no such things as selves. My trouble is
that a problem must be a problem about something: even if there are no selves, there
must at least be some problematic idea or concept of a self, if there is to be a problem
of the self. As far as I can see there is no such idea. What is a self? For every answer to
this question, there is another answer not only incompatible with it, but wholly
unrelated. There is virtually no agreement about the characteristic features of selves:
depending on whom you believe, selves may be concrete or abstract, material or
immaterial, permanent or ephemeral, naturally occuring or human constructions,
essentially subjective or publicly observable, the same or not the same things as people.
There are not even any agreed paradigm cases of selves, things we could point to or
describe and say, ‘A self is one of those.’ But no concept could be so problematic that
no one could agree about anything to do with it. For lack of a subject matter, then,
there is no problem of the self.
So I shall argue, anyway. I am not just quibbling about a word. Real philosophy is
at stake. Many philosophers assume that there is something properly called the prob-
lem or problems of the self, and write as if everyone knew what they meant by ‘self’.
This often leads to obscurity and muddle. If I am right, the muddle arises because
those philosophers believe in a concept that doesn’t exist.
I claim also that if we look at those books and articles with titles like ‘The Self’ or
‘Problems of the Self’, we will find that they are most typically not about ‘selves’ at
all, but about other things — different things in different cases. In fact the matters dis-
cussed under the heading of ‘self’ are so various that no one can seriously say that
they are all about some one thing, the self. Because legitimate inquiries that go under
the heading of ‘self’ are really about something else, and can be (and typically are)
put in other terms, we can easily do without the word ‘self’.
For these reasons, I believe that philosophers would do well to avoid the word
‘self’ in their theorizing.1
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, No. 5–6, 1998, pp. 645–57
[1] This idea is not new. F.H. Bradley once wrote, ‘Self has turned out to mean so many things, to mean
them so ambiguously, and to be so wavering in its applications, that we do not feel encouraged’ (1893,
p. 101). Alston (1977), Flew (1949; 1993), and Toulmin (1977) have said similar things. Since many
II
What would the problem of the self be about, if there were such a problem? What is
this ‘self’ whose existence and properties appear to be the subject of so much debate?
What distinguishes problems about the self from problems about other topics —
causation or intrinsic value, say? If there is any genuine problem of the self, there
must be some nontrivial answer, however vague or incomplete, to these questions.
There are several ways of trying to meet this demand. The most satisfactory would
be to give a definition of the term or an analysis of the concept. A definition of ‘self’
would say, ‘x is y’s self if and only if . . .’, with the dots filled in by some synonymous
or at least logically equivalent phrase. I say that the phrase to be explained is ‘x is y’s
self’ rather than ‘x is a self’ (less formally, ‘one’s self’ rather than simply ‘a self’)
because it is part of the meaning of the word ‘self’, in its typical philosophical uses,
that a self be someone’s self. (That much, anyway, seems clear.) Or if there could be
‘unowned’ selves, it is part of the idea of a self that it at least be the sort of thing that
could be the self of a particular person or thing. If someone could explain ‘x is a self’
but not ‘x is y’s self’, or if someone could distinguish selves from non-selves but had
no idea what made a given self the self of a particular person, I think most ‘self’-users
would doubt that he knew what the word meant. The word ‘self’ is like the word
‘body’, as in the phrase ‘human body’: anyone who knows what the words ‘human
body’ mean must have at least some idea of what it is for something to be the body, or
at least a body, of a particular person (van Inwagen, 1980). We can easily define ‘x is
a self’ in terms of ‘x is y’s self’: x is a self just in case there is (or could be) some y such
that x is y’s self. But there is no obvious way of deriving an account of the meaning of
‘x is y’s self’ from a definition of ‘x is a self’. Thus, even if we succeeded in defining
‘x is a self’ we should still face the task of accounting for ‘x is y’s self’.
If we use a word that we can’t define, or that we can’t define in a way that others
who use it will accept, we must be on our guard — the more so if the word is a piece of
philosophical jargon that has no place in ordinary language. (Part of the trouble with
‘self’ is that it is jargon masquerading as ordinary language.) It will be a real question
whether those who use the word are in any sense talking about the same thing. Any-
one who uses a word whose definition is disputed is obliged to say what she means by
it. If we cannot do so, we have to wonder whether we understand what we are saying.
But a word isn’t necessarily in serious trouble just because it has no agreed defini-
tion. There are other ways of saying what a self is than by explicitly defining it. We
could mention some characteristic features of selves — features that may not neces-
sarily be shared by all and only selves, but which selves at least typically have and
non-selves typically lack. A longish list of such features would give us a fair idea of
what a self is.
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seem to have paid no heed, however, it seems worthwhile making the point again in a different way.
I hope it will be obvious that I have no quarrel with the word ‘self’ as it appears within reflexive
pronouns or as a prefix (or even as it appears in idioms such as ‘self and other’, which, I take it, means
nothing more than ‘oneself and other beings’). I understand well enough what it means to say that Jane
burned or contradicted herself, or that Fred lacks self-control or is self-taught. But I don’t understand
what it could mean to say that you and I might exchange selves, or that a human being may have more
than one self, or that the self is unobservable or doesn’t exist — or at least not without some special
explanation of what the word ‘self’ means here. Likewise, I understand what it means to say that I am
thinking, but not what it means to say that the I (or the ‘I’, as it often appears) is thinking.
Failing both a definition and a list of characteristic features, we could at least begin
to answer the question, What is a self? by referring to some paradigm cases of selves
— particular things that everyone agrees are selves, or that would be selves if there
were any selves — and some paradigm cases of non-selves. Of course, this strategy
faces well-known difficulties: even if you can figure out which particular things I am
referring to, you might not be able to guess what it is about those things that makes
them all selves, and so have no idea what other things count as selves or why. (If I
point to a shoe, a lampshade, a book, and a carrot, and say, ‘Melves are things like
those,’ obviously that won’t suffice to tell you what I mean by ‘melf’; nor will it help
much if I go on to tell you that stones and forks are not melves.) Still, I should have
given you at least some information about what a self is.
Let me illustrate these rather abstract points with a concrete example. There is no
agreed account of the meaning of the term ‘mind’ or ‘mental’, of what makes a phe-
nomenon mental rather than non-mental. Intentionality (‘aboutness’), subjectivity
(‘what it is like’), immediate accessibility to consciousness, and many other features
have been proposed as ‘marks of the mental’; but none of these accounts is widely ac-
cepted. This is a problem. In a sense, we don’t know what the mind is. At the same
time, we know rather a lot about the mind. Nearly everyone agrees that mental phe-
nomena, if there are any, often have intentionality and subjectivity, and are often ac-
cessible to consciousness, even if these features don’t suffice to define the mental.
We agree on a wide range of typical and characteristic features of mental phenomena:
everyone agrees, for instance, that the desire for rain is satisfied by rain and frustrated
by persistent dry weather, and that being in the presence of rain usually causes one to
believe that it’s raining. And we agree on paradigm cases: no one doubts that beliefs,
wants, memories, intentions, sensations, emotions, and dreams, if there are such
things, are mental phenomena, and that earthquakes and temperatures are not. Even
those who deny that there are any mental phenomena can reasonably claim to under-
stand what it is whose existence they are denying. Thus, although there is some dis-
pute about just what the subject matter of psychology or the philosophy of mind may
be, there seems to be enough agreement that many of our questions can be said to be
questions about the mind.
On the other hand, if a large minority of philosophers and psychologists thought
that beliefs, though they exist, were not mental phenomena at all, but took something
completely different — photosynthesis, say — as paradigmatic of the mental, it
would be clear that there was serious confusion afoot. Matters would be even worse if
there were respected participants in the debate who thought that many non-mental
but few mental phenomena had properties like intentionality or subjectivity. Al-
though there would certainly be a problem about the word ‘mind’ in that case, it
would be a good deal less clear that there was a philosophical problem of the mind.
For what, beyond the word, could it be a problem about? The case of the self is rather
like that.
III
Let us consider some attempts to say what a self might be. It doesn’t matter whether
we take these proposals to be definitions of ‘self’ or only as giving essential or para-
digmatic or at any rate salient features of selves. Take them as proposed answers to
the ordinary question, What is a self?
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Account 1. One’s self is that unchanging, simple substance to which one’s impressions
and ideas have reference.
This is apparently what Hume sought in vain within himself (1978, p. 251). We may
wonder what Hume meant by ideas ‘having reference to’ one’s self. But the main
thing to be said about this account is that most present-day philosophers see no rea-
son to believe that any unchanging, simple substance has anything to do with anyo-
ne’s ideas or impressions. If this is what selves are, there are simply no selves, and the
problem of the self is of little more than historical interest. For an account of ‘self’
that reflects today’s concerns we must look elsewhere.
Here is an updated version of something like Hume’s account:
Account 2. One’s self is the inner subject of one’s conscious experiences.
(Campbell, 1957, p. 74; Harré, 1987, p. 99.) Variants include ‘One’s self is the bearer
of one’s personal identity over time’ (Berofsky, 1995, p. 234); ‘. . . that which views
the world through one’s eyes’ (Nagel, 1986, p. 55); ‘. . . the tautological subject of
one’s actions’ (Rée, 1974, p. 188n.); ‘the cause of everything one does’ (Minsky,
1985, p. 232); etc.
Now I take it that I am the subject of my conscious experiences, the bearer of my
identity over time, and the cause of everything I do. Otherwise they wouldn’t be my
experiences, my identity, or things that I do. On this account, then, I am my self, and
you are yours. Everyone is identical with his self. If there should turn out to be no
selves, there would be no such beings as you and I. And although some philosophers
accept this inference, others reject it: they think that the existence of selves is prob-
lematic in a way that the existence of midwives and plumbers, or of you and me, is not
(e.g. Harré, 1987, p. 103). In fact those who argue that ‘there is no self’ rarely go on to
conclude from this that they themselves do not exist. Their problem of the self must
be about something else.
Although the above account seems to imply that selves are people, it doesn’t say
that the two terms are synonymous. But many philosophers use the terms inter-
changeably (e.g. Mellor, 1991; Bermúdez, 1997). So we might say:
Account 3. One’s self is just that person, himself.
Selves are just people, human beings. To say that the self is so-and-so is to say that
people, you and I, are so-and-so. This makes it rather awkward to say that one has a
self. What could it be for me to have a person, or to have myself? The truth, rather, is
that we are selves. But we could presumably explain away talk of having a self as a
hangover from the eighteenth-century use of the word ‘self’.
If this account were widely accepted, I shouldn’t be writing this essay. To be sure,
the word ‘person’ is problematic enough that anyone who relies on it in philosophical
discussion had better say what she means by it. There is a good deal of dispute about
its definition, and about whether it can be defined at all. Compared with ‘self’,
though, ‘person’ is a model of clarity and accord. Everyone agrees that people (per-
sons) characteristically have certain mental capacities such as rationality and self-
consciousness, and certain moral attributes such as accountability for their actions
(or at any rate that they are capable of acquiring such features). There is a fair consen-
sus about what things count as people: no one doubts that you and I and Boris Yeltsin
are people, and that houses and bronze statues of people aren’t. Although there are
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disputed cases (foetuses, infants, adults suffering from severe senile dementia), their
number is small compared with the number of items we can confidently classify as
people or non-people. In this respect ‘person’ is no worse off than most other nouns.
We know how many people there are (a few hard cases aside, once more) and how to
count them. The word ‘person’ is well enough understood for there to be philosophi-
cal problems about people.
But many philosophers explicitly deny that ‘self’ and ‘person’ are interchange-
able. For example, some say that dogs and dolphins are, or have, selves, even though
they aren’t people (Lowe, 1996, p. 49n.). More seriously, it is often said that ‘person’
has to do with a publicly observable, social being whereas a self is essentially some-
thing inner or private (e.g. Harré, 1984, p. 26; McCall, 1990, pp. 12–15; see also
Campbell, 1957, p. 93; Hamlyn, 1984, p. 188). Others say that people but not selves
can be des- cribed, identified, and counted (Abelson, 1977, p. 87). This suggests that
you and I are not selves, but rather have them — assuming, at least, that we are people,
or that we are publicly observable or countable or identifiable. What, then, are selves?
We might say:
Account 4. One’s self is that indescribable and unidentifiable private, inner being within
one.
(‘By “self” I mean the personal unity I take myself to be, my singular inner being, so
to speak’ [Harré, 1984, p. 26].)
Now this is completely unhelpful. We might as well say that the self is ‘the elusive
“I” that shows an alarming tendency to disappear when we try to introspect it’, a defi-
nition (tongue in cheek, I assume) found in a popular philosophical dictionary
(Blackburn, 1994, p. 344). You can’t explain what a self is by saying that it is some-
thing inner and ineffable, any more than you can do so by saying that it is a certain
kind of ‘I’. Of course, if the self really is something ineffable, this is no criticism. You
can’t describe the indescribable. The challenge for those who think they understand
this account is to persuade the rest of us to take them seriously.
‘One’s self is what one identifies oneself with, what a person cares most about, the
loss of which amounts, for him, to self-destruction, either partial or total’ (Abelson,
1977, p. 91; see also James, 1905, p. 291; Berofsky, 1995). Thus we might write,
Account 5. One’s self is what one values above all else.
Of course, there may be a number of things that someone values above all else, and
whose destruction would be as bad for her as her own destruction. So it would not be
uncommon for someone to have several different selves at once, on this account
(‘The piano is my second self,’ said Chopin), as well as having different selves at dif-
ferent times; and different people would often share the very same self. The phrase
‘Mary’s self’ wouldn’t necessarily have unique reference. It would be more like ‘M-
ary’s brother’. In fact, Mary’s self might be her brother. There would be people
whose selves were houses, political causes, children, or pets. Many of those who use
the word ‘self’ would reject this consequence as absurd.
Let us continue our catalogue:
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Account 6. One’s self is the unconscious mechanism responsible for the unity of one’s
consciousness.
(Brooks 1994, pp. 36, 51.) On this account, there is nothing subjective or ineffable or
immaterial about the self; nor are selves people. My self may be literally an organ, a
part of my brain, a matter for physiologists to investigate.
Others suggest that the self is not a material part of one but rather an attribute, typi-
cally an aspect of one’s personality or character or behaviour:
Account 7. One’s self is a psychological or behavioural attribute of one.
But which psychological or behavioural attribute? No one would count my fear of
close spaces as a serious candidate for being my self. One view is that one’s self is the
way one sees oneself, or a certain set of one’s beliefs about oneself: one’s self is
roughly one’s self-image (Rogers, 1951, pp. 498; Harré, 1984, p. 26; Marx and Hil-
lix, 1973, p. 605). I suppose Dennett’s account of the self as a ‘center of narrative
gravity’ might be something like this, though it is far from clear just what he means
by that phrase (1991, pp. 416, 427). On this view a person’s self is typically unique,
and one may have different selves at different times, perhaps even more than one self
at once. Others say that one’s self is by definition unique: it is (for example) what is
expressed by one’s uniquely characteristic actions (Kenny, 1988, p. 33). In that case,
for all I know I may not have a self at all, as I cannot rule out the possibility that some-
where in the universe there is someone exactly like me in the relevant respects. For
that matter, it is consistent with everything we know that no one has a self. Even those
who consider it an open question whether there are any selves are unlikely to accept
that there could fail to be selves for that reason. By contrast, others take the self to be
‘man as he really is, not as he appears to himself’ (Jung, 1968, p. 186), or that collec-
tion of features shared by all and only human beings in all times and places (Solo-
mon, 1988, p. 4). One’s self is something like universal human nature. The very idea
of the self, on this account, ensures that we all have the same self, and that there could
not be more than one.
Naturally none of these variants will be acceptable to those who think that we are
selves, or that selves are things that think or experience. No one seriously supposes
that he is a psychological attribute. No psychological attribute could think about
Vienna, or sleep badly, or drink coffee.
Let us consider one more popular account:
Account 8. One’s self is an aggregate of or a construction out of one’s sense-
experiences.
(Ayer, 1946, p. 125; see also Broad, 1925, p. 282; Marx and Hillix, 1973, p. 605.) Let
us set aside the serious question of just what an ‘aggregate’ or ‘construction’ might
be. We might put the view more loosely by saying that one’s self is one’s mental life,
the sum-total of all of one’s thoughts and experiences, or perhaps some selected por-
tion thereof. This, I suppose, is the ‘bundle theory of the self’ often attributed to
Hume. Are you and I selves on this account? That depends on whether we are literally
made out of thoughts and experiences — whether an aggregate of thoughts and experi-
ences is the sort of thing that can do and be all of the things that you and I can do and be.
(Can a bundle of thoughts ride a bicycle? Could a bundle of thoughts have consisted of
completely different thoughts?) This is a familiar problem about personal identity.
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IV
What, then, of the problem of the self? What is it a problem about? There is clearly
nothing that satisfies all of these accounts. There aren’t even two or three similar
kinds of things that each satisfy most of them. It should be equally clear that there is
no one thing — no single idea — that all of these accounts could reasonably be seen
as trying to capture. There is no one sort of thing that some believe is a construction
out of sense-impressions and others take to be a mental attribute, a simple substance,
an organ, a human being, or in some cases even a house or a hamster. It should also be
clear that there are no agreed characteristic attributes of selves, or even any generally
accepted cases. (We can’t even pick out a self in a purely relational way, for example
as ‘Bertrand Russell’s self’, without controversy, for on some accounts of ‘self’ there
are no selves to pick out, while on others Russell might have had any number of
different selves.) I conclude that those who use the word ‘self’, if they are saying any-
thing coherent at all, must be talking about completely different things. Thus, there is
no such idea as the idea of the self, and therefore nothing for the ‘problem of the self’
to be a problem about.
There are several replies that someone might make to this argument. First, our
catalogue of answers to the question, What is a self? is incomplete. We may have
neglected one that would solve the problem. Of course, the mere fact that there are
other accounts different from those mentioned is no help to those who believe in the
problem of the self. Simply extending the list will only make matters worse. What we
need is not just an account of the self that would command wider assent than any of
these, but one that would synthesize them and show them all to reflect a part of some
larger, common idea. But we can say no more about this possibility until someone
produces a candidate for that role.
Second, one might argue that this lack of agreement about selves is part of the very
problem I claim not to exist. Doesn’t this just show that the problem of the self is
more serious than we thought? That it is not only about the nature and existence of
selves and their relation to more familiar entities such as people and human beings,
but about the very meaning of the term? I can imagine someone comparing the prob-
lem of the self with the problem of race. There is no accepted account of what the
term ‘race’ or any of its determinates such as ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘coloured’, ‘slavic’,
‘oriental’, etc. mean. For this and other reasons, there is no end to the rubbish that has
been said and written about race. But aren’t those confused writings and sayings
about race? If there were no problem of the self for the reasons I have given, wouldn’t
it follow, absurdly, that there was no race problem?
The analogy is strained. Even if no one knows what race or individual races are,
there is wide agreement about a great deal of ‘race lore’. Whatever ‘black’ or ‘white’
might mean, everyone agrees that ‘black’ people typically (though not always) have
dark, curly hair and dark skin compared with ‘white’ people. Everyone agrees that
race, if there is such a thing, is an inherited trait, even if there is dispute about how the
race of one’s parents determines one’s own race. Most of us are disposed to class
most people into ‘black’, ‘white’, etc. in the same way, however arbitrary or unfair
those classifications may be. Everyone accepts certain paradigm cases: Nelson Man-
dela is clearly ‘black’, Margaret Thatcher is ‘white’, Mao Tse-Tung is ‘oriental’, and
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so on. So even the problematic term ‘race’ fares far better than ‘self’ in terms of char-
acteristic features, consistency of application, and paradigm cases.
At any rate, the comparison with ‘race’ can hardly be cheering for theorists of the
self. Of course there is a social ‘race problem’. But that problem is not so much about
race itself, whatever that may be, as about people’s attitudes. It arises not because dif-
ferent people belong to different races, but because people think they do, or rather
because they treat others differently on the basis of their outward appearance or that
of their ancestors. If everyone stopped doing that, the problem would go away. In this
sense there is indeed a ‘problem of the self’. The problem is that people use the word
‘self’ as if everyone knew what it meant when in fact there is no agreement about
what it means, and that this leads them into needless troubles. That ‘problem of the
self’ would be solved if people simply stopped using the word and others like it. But
that is not the problem of the self that my opponents believe in. There is a social
problem about the word ‘self’. There is no philosophical problem about selves.
A third reply would be to concede that there is no single concept of the self, but to
insist that there are, nonetheless, many different concepts properly so called. There
are different kinds of selves. Since the term is ambiguous, it may be a mistake to
speak of the self without specifying which ‘self’ we mean. But we do have ‘the
Humean self’, ‘the inner-subject self’, ‘the personal self’, ‘the ineffable self’, ‘the
evaluative self’, and so on, each with its own set of problems. Don’t these ideas give
us a set of problems of the self?
Only in the most trivial sense. Once we concede that the various uses of the term
‘self’ have nothing more in common than the word, we can see that it could be a pun
to say that they are all nevertheless problems of the self. We might as well say that the
‘problem of property’ includes both debates about the legal institution of ownership
and the metaphysical problem of universals. On the other hand, if the various ac-
counts of the self do have some interesting content in common, we ought to be able to
say what it is, and thus give an account of the meaning of the word, however vague or
incomplete, that everyone can accept.
V
I said I was going to argue not only that there is no problem of the self, properly so
called, but also that careless use of the term ‘self’ creates trouble we could otherwise
avoid. I will mention a few examples of that trouble.
Some philosophers seem to be aware that the term ‘self’ is wildly ambiguous.
Owen Flanagan, for example, writes,
The word ‘self’ has many meanings — personality, character, an individual’s central
character traits, the way(s) one carries oneself in the world, the way one represents one-
self to oneself and to others, the dynamic integrated system of thoughts, emotions, lived
events, and so on, that make up who one is from the God’s eye point of view. All these
senses are useful (1996, p. vii).
We should expect someone of this view to take care always to explain what he meant
when he used the word ‘self’. But Flanagan goes on to say that Augustine’s Confes-
sions is ‘the story of a single self’, and to ask whether every individual has ‘one and
only one self’, without giving any indication of whether he means central character
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traits, the way one represents oneself to others, or any of the other items on his list,
leaving the reader to guess what claim is intended (pp. 95 f.).2
This can lead to more serious trouble. Consider this quotation:
If A’s brain is put into B’s body, would A’s Self move into B’s body? Clearly, if the
bodies were different (A might be a man, and B a woman) then the Self could hardly be
the same — for our notion of Self is surely bound up with our potentialities and our
behaviour. At most there could be but a kind of inner core of Self (which might be
memories?) remaining after a radical change of body. Suppose, though, that A and B are
identical twins and equally fit. Would they swap selves with a brain transplant?’
(Gregory, 1981, p. 491)
Well, would the result of putting your brain into the head of your identical twin and
his brain into yours be that you got what was previously his self and he got the self
that was once yours? There are many questions we might ask about this imaginary
case. We can ask what would happen to you: which, if any, of the two resulting
people, if they would be people at all, would be you. We can ask whether the being
got by putting your brain into your twin’s cranium would have memories, personal-
ity, self-image, and other psychological features that were more like yours or more
like those of your twin, or which person — you or your twin or someone else — he
would think he was. And so on. But what could it mean to ask whether you and he
would exchange selves? Suppose someone insisted that you would indeed exchange
selves. Would you agree or disagree? What sort of argument would support or under-
mine this claim? What consequences, if any, would it have for the way the other ques-
tions are answered? Until the author tells us what he means by ‘self’, we can have no
idea. Yet he apparently sees no need to do so.
The same trouble arises when people ask whether someone with a split personality
has more than one self, or whether we create two different selves by cutting the
cerebral commissures, or whether one can become a different self through religious
conversion, psychic trauma, education, or some other experience. Anyone familiar
with philosophical writing that purports to be about the self will recognize claims like
these:
The self exists (does not exist).
The self is identical (is not identical) with the body.
The self is not an object.
A human being can have (cannot have) more than one self at once.
Human beings have selves but lobsters don’t.
The first-person pronoun purports to pick out a self qua self.
Without further elucidation, I don’t understand any of these claims well enough to
know even whether I agree or disagree. And for anyone who thinks he understands
them perfectly well, there will be another who feels equally confident, but who un-
derstands them in a completely different way. The reason is that unless the word
‘self’ as it figures in these sentences is explicitly given some special meaning, they
simply don’t say anything at all.
Let us consider one more example. Galen Strawson writes,
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[2] Elsewhere he writes, ‘One useful way of conceiving of the self is as a kind of structured life . . .’ (p. 67),
and then says on the next page that the various twists and turns in one’s life ‘have to be part of the life of
a single self’. Unless something can both be and have a life, the point would have been more clearly put
in different words.
I will call my view the Pearl view, because it suggests that many mental selves exist, one
at a time and one after another, like pearls on a string, in the case of something like a
human being (1997, p. 424).
Each self, apparently, exists for as long as one’s attention is focused on some one
thing, typically two or three seconds, then perishes. But what is it that a human being
gets a new one of every few seconds? That is not so clear, despite Strawson’s at-
tempts to explain what he means by ‘self’. The idea seems to be something like this:
One’s self is that distinct, mental thing within one that is a subject of experience and a
single thing within any hiatus-free period of experience.
(The bit about one’s self being ‘within’ one is a guess; Strawson doesn’t say what
makes a self the self of a particular person.) I take it that something is a ‘subject of
experience’ just in case it has experiences — just in case it sees, feels, hears, and so
on. But I see, feel and hear. The question, then, is whether I am ‘distinct’, ‘mental’, or
‘a single thing’ (it doesn’t matter for present purposes what those terms of art mean).
If I am, it appears to follow from Strawson’s view that I am my self, and that Strawson
is Strawson’s self. Otherwise, if I have a self at all, it must be a subject of experience
other than me — something else that sees, feels, and hears everything that I see, feel,
and hear. I hope we may assume that there aren’t two sentient beings living within my
skin, I and my self. And Strawson seems inclined to think that there are such things as
selves. Thus, although he never says so explicitly, his view seems to be that each per-
son is ordinarily identical with his self.
If this is right, then Strawson is telling us that he himself exists (or existed) for only
two or three seconds. Or rather, he, Galen Strawson, does not exist at all — for what
could make it the case that one rather than any other of those billion or so two-second
beings that are the successive ‘selves’ of a certain tall, blond-haired human being was
Strawson? The article attributed to him was in fact written by a vast committee of
authors, none of whom contributed so much as an entire sentence. And the same goes
for you and me, unless your attention span is considerably longer: you are not the be-
ing who read the previous sentence a moment ago. You didn’t exist then. The slight-
est lapse of attention is literally fatal: it destroys you and replaces you with someone
else — someone rather like you, but numerically different.
That, surely, is incredible. Anyone who reaches the conclusion that none of us ex-
ist, or at least none for longer than a few seconds, must have gone wrong somewhere,
just as certainly as someone who concludes that motion is impossible. At any rate, we
can accept Strawson’s conclusion (or try to accept it) only if it is clear that it follows
inexorably from premises whose truth is even more obvious than that you and I exist,
and that we existed ten seconds ago. Strawson apparently thinks that it follows inexo-
rably from the fact that our thoughts don’t flow in a single, unified stream, but are dis-
jointed and gappy. The premise is probably true. But I can’t begin to see how this
entails Strawson’s conclusion. Even if there are things that last only as long as one’s
attention remains focussed on something — ‘sets of neuron-constituting atoms in a
certain state of activation’ (p. 425), if you like — why suppose that you and I are such
things? Why couldn’t we be human beings? Why couldn’t human beings be the sub-
jects of disjointed thoughts and experiences? What is it about lapses of attention that
makes it impossible for anything to survive them?
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My point is not to criticize Strawson’s view as implausible or unsupported, but
rather to illustrate the perils of relying on terms like ‘self’ in doing philosophy. I
doubt that Strawson would have reached this absurd conclusion had he put his ques-
tions in other terms. If he had simply asked, What sort of thing am I? (Am I a mental
thing, a substance, unified synchronically and diachronically, etc.? Am I the sort of
thing I ordinarily believe myself to be?) instead of asking about the nature of ‘the
mental self’, I doubt that he would have answered, ‘I am a thing that lasts only as long
as its attention remains fixed and then perishes and is replaced by something else.’
The claim that a human being acquires a new ‘mental self’ every few seconds may
sound surprising. The claim that you and I did not exist five seconds ago turns the
world upside down. I suspect that Strawson didn’t mean to endorse this view at all,
and that he was lured into saying something that implies it by the seductions of the
word ‘self’. (If he did mean it, why not make it plain? As if the nonexistence of people
were a corollary too trivial to mention!) But if that is not what he meant, I have no
idea what ‘the Pearl view’ is meant to be a theory about.
VI
If there is nothing properly called the problem of the self, what of those books and
articles that appear to be about the self? Must we commit them to the flames? Not at
all. Despite their titles, they are typically not about ‘the self’ at all. They are about
issues like these:
Personal identity. What does it take for you and me to persist through time? What
determines how many people there are at any given time? (Is the number of human
people always the same as the number of human animals, for example?) What sort of
things are you and I? Are we immaterial substances? Mere ‘bundles’ of thoughts?
Living organisms? Material objects different from but ‘constituted by’ organisms?
Semantics. What are the semantic properties of first-person pronouns such as ‘I’?
How and to what do they refer, if they refer at all? What distinguishes first-person
beliefs such as my belief that I have brown eyes from third-person beliefs such as the
belief that Eric Olson has brown eyes? Does this difference involve irreducibly sub-
jective facts?
Philosophy of mind. What is it for one’s mental contents to be unified, and to what
degree is this ordinarily the case? What, if anything, causes this unity? To what ex-
tent are we aware of what goes on in our minds? What is self-consciousness, and how
does it relate to consciousness in general?
Moral psychology. What is it that one cares about most, that one identifies with in
the sense of regarding its flourishing as a large part of one’s own well-being? What
makes a project, belief, value, pattern of behaviour, or personality trait autonomous
or authentic, fully one’s own, and not merely the result of our upbringing or peer
pressure? How do these issues connect with moral responsibility?
Cognitive psychology. What is involved in forms of reflexive conduct such as
knowing one’s own mind, in the sense of having settled, consistent and realistic in-
tentions? Or knowing one’s own capacities and propensities, in the sense of being
able to judge realistically what one can do and is likely to do? Or recognizing one’s
standing as one agent among others and seeing one’s desires in relation to those of
others? Or being in command of oneself, in the sense of being able to match one’s
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conduct to one’s intentions? How do these reflexive abilities relate to one another?
How are they acquired? What happens when they are absent? How does one’s mental
picture of oneself relate to the way one really is? How does one acquire that distinct-
iveness that makes one different from others?
Epistemology. What are the varieties of first-person knowledge? How do we get
knowledge of our own psychological states? Is it something like sense perception?
What kinds of first-person knowledge are immune to error through misidentifica-
tion? What is the nature and extent of proprioception and other forms of first-person
knowledge of one’s physical properties?
And so on.
You might think that these, and others like them, are the very ‘problems of the self’
whose existence I have denied. I grant that they are not completely unrelated. When
you pick up a book whose title includes the free-standing noun ‘self’, you have at
least some idea of what it will be about. (It won’t be about cookery or geology.) But
we shouldn’t make too much of this. These problems have even less in common than
the various accounts of what a self is discussed earlier. If they did have some idea in
common, then once again we ought to be able to use that idea to explain what every-
one means by ‘self’. Yet no one has been able to do this.
Moreover, all of these problems can be put without using the word ‘self’, as the
way I put them shows. All of the intelligible content of what are called problems of
the self can be captured in this way. If we had answers to all of these questions, there
would be no further ‘problem of the self’ remaining to be solved. There is nothing left
over that can be expressed only in terms of words like ‘self’. One of the unfortunate
consequences of using the word ‘self’ in doing philosophy is that it encourages us to
look for entities that we have no other reason to believe in. Once we have accounted
for people, their mental features, their relation to those human animals we call their
bodies, and so on, we think we need to say something about ‘the self’ as well. There is
no good reason to think so.
Or so I claim. Of course, merely putting a number of so-called problems of the self
in other terms doesn’t show that the term ‘self’ is superfluous. I may have overlooked
legitimate problems or questions that can be put only in terms of the free-standing
noun ‘self’ or some equivalent term. In that case I should have to retract my claim that
there is no legitimate problem of the self — though the problem so revealed is un-
likely to be the problem commonly thought to bear that name.
But if the word ‘self’ really has no agreed meaning, and leads us into troubles we
could otherwise avoid, and if we can easily get on with our legimate philosophical
inquiries without it, there can be no reason, other than tradition, to continue to speak
of the self.3
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